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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
As a student of both international relations and international law; I have more often 
than not come across the same contemporary global issues and had to discuss said 
issues within a political or legal discourse using their respective vernaculars. I have 
also, more often than not, found that each discourse relies heavily on aspects of the 
other to adequately assess a particular phenomenon. The interconnectivity of both 
discourses is extensive and distinguishing between both proves rather difficult and 
inconsequential. This is to say that the collaboration of both disciplines within the 
analysis of a global conflict provides a more in-depth analysis than either discipline 
could separately. This practice is already present within both fields however the 
parameters of this approach and a refined methodology are yet to be determined. For 
that reason, this paper advocates for a formal interdisciplinary approach to the 
assessment of global conflicts which otherwise utilizes one approach or the other.  
This multifaceted approach would provide a more practical and more detailed insight 
and analysis into the causes and effects of the contemporary issues that dominate the 
international arena and resonate throughout both disciplines.  
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Introduction: 
 
As a student of both international relations and international law; I have more often 
than not come across the same contemporary global issues and had to discuss said 
issues within a political or legal discourse using their respective vernaculars. I have 
also, more often than not, found that each discourse relies heavily on aspects of the 
other to adequately assess a particular phenomenon. As Christian Rues-Smit 
articulates: 
"The discourse of politics is now replete with the language of law and 
legitimacy as much as realpolitik, lawyers are as central to military campaigns 
as strategists, legal right is as much a power resource as guns and money, and 
juridical sovereignty, grounded in the legal norms of international society, is 
becoming a key determinant of state power."
1
 
The injection of legal terms into political discourse is mirrored within the 
international legal discipline as political terms and international relations concepts are 
inescapable when discussing the formation or application of international law within 
an anarchic global system made up of political actors.As Hans Morgenthau states, 
"Where there is neither a community of interest nor a balance of power, there is no 
international law."
2 
Yet despite the advanced interconnectivity; "politics and law have long been seen as 
separate domains of international relations, as realms of action with their own 
distinctive rationalities and consequences."
3
 Rues-Smit goes on to articulate that this 
particular view regarding the separation of politics and law has led to the formation of 
"parallel yet carefully quarantined fields of inquiry."
4
 In other words, political and 
legal discourses act as separate and distinct lenses, each providing a different view on 
a particular situation. This idea is not specific to legal and political discourses as 
Morgenthau also asserts that a  "political realist thinks in terms of interest defined as 
power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of 
conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of conformity of action with moral 
                                                           
1
CHRISTIAN RUES-SMIT, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,2(Cambridge University Press 2004) 
(2004).  
2
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE, 296(6th 
ed., McGraw-Hill, 1985) (1985). 
3Supra note 1, at 1. 
4Id.. 
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principles."
5
 However in regards to international law, Rues-Smit illustrates that many 
scholars have "acquiesced in this separation" and presented international law as a 
"regulatory regime, external to the cut and thrust of international politics."
6
Rues-Smit 
goes on to articulate that legal philosophers have often set out "to quarantine law from 
politics for fear that the intrusion of politics would undermine the distinctive character 
of law as an impartial system of rules."
7
 This perspective of treating international 
politics and international law as distinct has translated into the respective international 
relations and international law curriculums as "students of international law have 
learnt doctrine and process but not politics."
8
 
This anachronistic separation of international law and politics is easily exposed for its 
flaws through the observation of contemporary global events such as the intervention 
in Kosovo, the ICJ advisory opinion regarding nuclear weapons, the Pinochet case, as 
well as the war on terror and particularly, the case of the 2003 Iraq War. The major 
conflicts within the international community are complex and diverse by nature. The 
entanglement of law and politics is prevalent throughout all these issues and the 
delineation between the political and legal aspects is not only increasingly difficult, if 
not impossible, but genuinely irrelevant. The said irrelevance has even warranted a 
call for bridging the divide between the disciplines of international relations and 
international law within recent years.
9
 This shift is unsurprising given that the benefits 
of an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing global conflicts are numerous to say the 
least. An interdisciplinary approach can be defined as an approach to the assessment 
of a situation that utilizes more than one branch of knowledge. The process involves 
the utilization of methods and concepts specific to more than one discipline in 
answering a question or assessing a situation. The reasons behind employing aspects 
                                                           
5Supra note 2, at 13. 
6Supra note 1, at 1. 
7Id. 
8Id. 
9See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 
(2)Harv. Int'l L.J.,(1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 (2)Amr J.  Int'l L., (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, 
and Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 (3) Amr J.  Int'l L., (1998); Robert J. Beck, International Law and 
International Relations: The Prospects for Interdisciplinary Collaboration, 1 J. of Int'l L. Std.:Kenneth 
W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14(2) 
Yale J. Int'l L., (1989). 
3 
 
of another discipline, in this case politics or international relations, in answering 
international legal questions are many and range from attempting to address 
insufficiency in the law to addressing increasingly complex and multilayered global 
conflicts. As Articulated in International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, "some proponents of 
interdisciplinary scholarship saw IL as a patient and IR as the cure."
10
 This point is 
supported further by arguments that suggest that the shifting nature of global conflicts 
in the modern era, exemplified by the increased role and influence of non-state actors, 
presents an array of issues that international law is unequipped to handle. 
International law would thus require politics or international relations theories to help 
fill in the gaps.I would however argue that the necessity of an interdisciplinary 
approach stems from the complexities of international conflicts that warrant a 
multifaceted approach rather than solely from inherent shortcomings of the 
international legal system. Authors are in fact already utilizing said approach in their 
analysis of global conflicts; however, said use is informal in the sense that it is not 
part of a joint discipline or a formal methodology.Authors employing such an 
approach have relied on their own terms of engagement in addition to their respective 
differing definitions of international law and politics. In this regard, a formal 
interdisciplinary approach would focus on establishing parameters and mapping out 
the terms of engagement between both disciplines in order to refine what is already a 
beneficial approach. Establishing a clear agenda, with the aim of bridging the gap 
between the disciplines, for the development of this approach would only enhance the 
advantages it already offers. 
This paper is thus a response to the dichotomization of international law and politics 
within the international arena as well as a call for deepening the already blooming 
conversation. I will illustrate that the gap between the two disciplines brought on by 
this dichotomization between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ lacks relevance and pragmatism in 
the analysis of global conflicts and particularly in regards to the use of force. And 
thus, an interdisciplinary approach that utilizes international law and international 
politics as one lens would lead to the most fruitful and detailed assessment of any 
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Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 (3) Am. J. Int'l L., (1998). 
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international situation. I will also illustrate that this particular approach is already 
being utilized within the various and differing perspectives included within this paper. 
This paper will use the 2003 Iraq War,which represents a fundamental divide 
within international legal discourse, to illustrate that regardless of the perspective 
regarding the legality or legitimacy of a conflict; separation of the political and legal 
components is impossible as well as counterproductive.The Iraq War proves to be a 
useful example, as it provides for a plethora of differing perspectives regarding the 
legality and legitimacy of this invasion given that each perspective is premised on a 
certain understanding of the relationship between international law and politics. It is 
important to note that regardless of the specific definitions employed for both politics 
and law respectively, there exists little disagreement, among scholars and 
international institutions, over the general inherent interconnectivity of the two. This 
point is illustrated by MarttiKoskenniemi’s assertion that even an international legal 
institution such as the ICC, for instance, is not attempting to circumvent politics but to 
shift politics in a manner that aligns with its doctrine.
11
Nouwen and Werner argue that 
politics is intertwined in every aspect of the ICC, for example, from its creation, to the 
type of cases it takes, to the ongoing battle of establishing criminal accountability in 
the face of political bargaining and immunity.
12
 
 
In the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the divide within the discourse is due to the 
supposed blatant violations by the United States in their supposed disregard of 
international law in pursuit of their national interests. The US intervention in Iraq 
divided the international community due to both the nature of the intervention and the 
manner in which it allegedly conflicts with fundamental legal concepts within 
international customary law as well as the UN Charter. As important as this debate is 
to understanding international law, it is important to note that this is not only a 
question of legality but also legitimacy. As regardless of whether the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq was legal or illegal, it is important to ask whether it was just. 
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MARTTIKOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press 2001 )(2001). 
12
Sarah MH. Nouwen, and Wouter G. Werner. Doing justice to the political: The international criminal 
court in Uganda and Sudan, 21.4 Eur. J. Int'l L. 942, 942-943 (2010). 
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This paper seeks to assess the interplay between politics and international law and the 
subsequent ramifications for the legality and legitimacy of events. In a formal system, 
the legality of a particular act is subject to the legal norms or principles that regulate it 
and the legitimacy of the act would stem from its lawfulness. Legitimacy in this 
regard refers to the political perception regarding a certain act that deems it just or 
unjust. It is important to note that the diversity within the international community 
leads to varying political perceptions and ideas of justice which render the task of 
determining legitimacy, as well as legality quite difficult to say the least. 
Had the United States acquired authorization prior to its invasion of Iraq and ended 
the debate surrounding Chapter VII of the UN Charter, would that have changed the 
outcome of their actions? JanneNijman illustrates the different perspectives on the 
Iraq War, within the context of legality and legitimacy. Said perspectives include 
those that perceive it to be: legal and legitimate, illegal but legitimate, illegal and 
illegitimate and finally as she proposes legal but illegitimate.
13
These four categories 
illustrate the various uses of this interdisciplinary approach and the ultimately varying 
conclusions reached by the authors in each category. The included authors have 
differing understandings of the relationship between international law and politics and 
thus do not always utilize each discipline equally within their respective analyses. The 
authors included in this paper, will be categorized according to said perspectives. 
Each author assessed the 2003 Invasion of Iraq through an approach that addressed 
the legality and legitimacy of the conflict, legality being a question of international 
law, and legitimacy being a question of political opinion or public morality. These 
interdisciplinary approaches utilized legal and political concepts to reach a conclusion 
regarding the Iraqi conflict and whether the actions taken by the parties involved were 
lawful and justified. The authors, regardless of their opinions on the conflict, or their 
partiality for interdisciplinary approaches, arrived at conclusions that relied on both 
the international legal and international relations disciplines. I would argue that the 
authors in each section utilize international legal and international relations concepts 
in their assessments; however, I would not argue that all the authors are doing so out 
of a motivation to utilize an interdisciplinary approach. Regardless of the motives 
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JanneNijman, After Iraq: Back to the International Rule of Law? An Introduction to the NYIL 2011 
Agora, 42 NYIL 71, 71-94 (2011). 
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behind the adoption of this approach by the authors, whether it is because they believe 
in the benefits of the approach, or if they were simply faced with a problem that 
international law could not solve on its own, it is important to note that that these 
proponents of various schools of thought ended up using the same approach. This 
phenomenon illustrates the advantages of such an approach regardless of the 
conclusions that one draws regarding a global event. 
Each of the legality/legitimacycategories is premised on its own definition of 
international law and politics as well as the relationship between the two concepts. 
However, these four categories prove to be too encompassing to illustrate the subtle 
differences of opinions between scholars that share the same overall perspective. For 
that reason, I will examine the perspectives of each scholar based on this series of 
questions: Was there Security Council authorization for the invasion? Were there 
legal grounds for self defense? Was the invasion of Iraq lawful? Was the invasion 
just? And ultimately, what is the relationship between international law and politics? 
The paper utilizes this information to illustrate the multifaceted nature of the conflict 
where the separation of the legal and political aspects is impossible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Legal and Legitimate: 
 
The first of these viewpoints which I will examine suggests that the invasion of Iraq 
was both legal and legitimate andauthorized by the principle of self-defense as well as 
the relevant binding Security Council resolutions. The arguments made to support this 
perception emphasize the importance of respecting the rule of law as well as 
normative national and international goals and the utilization of international law 
inachieving those goals. The arguments made focus heavily on legal justifications and 
one can clearly see the weight allocated to the importance of the international rule of 
law. In this perspective the law provides all necessary justification for the 2003 Iraq 
War and the issue lies with the interpretation of the law which requires development 
in the presence of new and changing threats. However as illustrated by Taft, 
Buchwald, and Frank, within this section, arriving at conclusion that the 2003 Iraq 
War was legal and legitimate does not require this particular understanding of the 
relevant legal justification.  
In an article published in the American Society of International Law by John 
Woo, the author argues that despite the criticisms of many members of the 
international community, the Iraq war was in fact justified due to the Iraqi violations 
of the Security Council Resolutions and that it is further justified under the principle 
of self-defense.
14
 This argument is premised on an understanding of self-defense and 
the related customary law that justifies anticipatory self-defense of preemptive strikes 
in the absence of an armed attack.
15
 
 
Was There Security Council Authorization for the Invasion?  
Woo answers yes, as in regards to the argument that cites the Security Council 
resolutions as justification of the Intervention in Iraq, Woo argues that resolution 678 
provided member states with all the justification they needed by authorizing them “to 
use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660(1990) and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions to restore international peace and security in the 
                                                           
.(2003) ,563Amr. J. Int'l L. , , International law and the war in IraqJohn Yoo 
14
 
15
Id., at 564. 
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area.”16 This argument may be a bit of a reach given that the resolutions that are being 
referenced were more than a decade old at the time of the intervention and attempting 
to present the Iraq intervention as a last chapter to the Gulf War of the early 1990s 
was not well received.Scholars such as Taft and Buchwald, as well as Thomas 
Franck,agreed that this particular use of force was legal and legitimate, but they did 
not believe that the Security Council provided authorization; they instead relied on 
their understandings of anticipatory self-defense to illustrate the lawfulness of the 
invasion. 
 
WereThereLegal Grounds for Self-Defense? 
Woo supplements his arguments that are premised on these particular resolutions with 
a more general justification based on the right to self-defense outlined in Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 is quite clear in its description of the 
necessary circumstances for the justification of self-defense by stating “Nothing in the 
present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measure necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.
17
This definition may seem to discredit any argument justifying the 
intervention in Iraq based on this principle given that an armed attack clearly did not 
occur. Woo however argues that there is no indication whatsoever that the drafters of 
the UN charter aimed to limit the concept of self-defense to that which requires an 
armed attack occur within a nation’s territory in order for the principle to come into 
effect.
18
Woo supports this argument by citing that anticipatory self defense was a well 
established aspect of the inherent right of self defense and even goes on to suggest 
that this aspect of customary law carried over to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
19
 Woo also 
goes on to cite, as most proponents of anticipatory self-defense do, the famous 
Caroline Incident of 1837.  
This is not to say that anticipatory or preemptive self-defense gives states the 
right to attack another state out of fear that the other state would someday attack it. As 
                                                           
16
Id., at 567. 
Oct. 24,  entered into force June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, ,U.N. CHARTER
17
1945, at art. 51. 
18
Supra note 14, at 571. 
19
Id. 
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Taft and Buchwald illustrate in Preemption, Iraq, and International law; states must 
justify their use of force by finding “legitimacy in the facts and circumstances that the 
state believes has made it necessary.”20  Of course, this interpretation affords states 
the freedom of justifying their beliefs through garnering any evidence that they deem 
legitimate. This divide further illustrates the degree to which politics and international 
law are intertwined as political decisions made by gathering intelligence(of doubtful 
accuracy) and weighing interests shape the international community’s understanding 
of legality and illegality.  
This particular perspective on self-defense that recognizes state practices and 
formed customs and not specifically Chapter VII of the UN Charter is not exclusive to 
Woo, as Thomas Franck also recognizes the importance of the custom surrounding 
self-defense in Terrorism and the Right to Self-Defense.
21
 Franck argues that self-
defense is an "inherent right" as stated in the charter, and thus all that self-defense 
entailed under customary international law prior to the formation of the United 
Nations is very much still relevant.
22
 States should thus respond to threats or uses of 
force without requiring authorization from the Security Council as states did not have 
to do so before.
23
 This perspective seems to undermine the changes to international 
law that have come about following the creation of the United Nations such as the 
prohibition on use of force or the outlawing of conquest. Regardless, Franck goes on 
to argue that states also are not required to provide evidence of the threat or evidence 
that points to the perpetrators in the aftermath of an attack, prior to its exercise of self 
defense.
24
 Franck argues that he is not suggesting that "the question of evidence is 
irrelevant in law" but rather that a state's inherent right of self-defense does not 
require a prior demonstration of evidence.
25
 
 
Was the Invasion of Iraq Lawful/Just? 
While the content of the arguments that Franck is making may be controversial it is 
important to focus on the fact that Franck employs a legal basis for his arguments. He 
                                                           
Amr. J. Int'l L. 557, , Preemption, Iraq, and international lawWilliam H.Taft and Todd F. Buchwald, 
20
.(2003) 563-557 
21
Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-defense, 95(4)Am. J. Int'l L. 839, (2001). 
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Id., at 840. 
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Id. 
24
Id., at 842. 
25
Id. 
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is not arguing that the law is insufficient in dealing with modern threats but rather the 
opposite and that the issue is the interpretation of the law.
26
 In his perspective, 
international law should be respected and actions should be justified by sufficient 
legal grounds in addition to normative objectives such as self-preservation.
27
 Needless 
to say, this opinion is shared by Woo, Taft, and Buchwald, regardless of the different 
specifics of their particular reasoning, who all believed that the actions were lawful 
and thus legitimate. Franck's perspective on the legality of the invasion stems from his 
perspectives regarding the erosion of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and 
the subsequent disintegration of the prohibition on the use of force. He goes on to 
suggest that the "blame for this must be shared by powerful, and even some not-so-
powerful, states which, from time to time over the past twenty-five years, have 
succumbed to the temptation to settle a score, to end a dispute or to pursue their 
national interests through the use of force."
28
 Franck cites the inherent flaws within 
the prohibition on use of force, such as Article 51 and the inability of the international 
system to determine the aggressor and the aggrieved during international incidents 
which thus leads to the continuous occurrence of wars.
29
 Another example Franck 
utilizes is the definition of force which can include different forms of pressure such as 
political and economic, which threaten "the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state."
30
 Aside from pointing out the inherent flaws within the 
prohibition on use of force, Franck also discusses the changing nature of modern 
warfare and its ramifications on this legal principle. He states in reference to the 
development of nuclear weapons that "taken literally, Articles 2(4) and 51 together 
seem to require a state to await an actual nuclear strike against its territory before 
taking forceful counter measures, if this is what the charter requires, then, to quote 
Mr. Bumble, the Charter is 'a ass'."
31
 Although Jane E. Stromseth recognizes the 
difficult state of the international legal system in governing the use of force, she takes 
on a less pessimistic perspective stating that "it is premature to pronounce the 'death' 
of the UN Charter or to give up on future prospects for Security Council agreement on 
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Id. 
28Thomas M. Franck, Who killed Article 2 (4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by 
States, 64.(5) Am J. Int'l L 809,809-837 (1970). 
29
Id. 
30Id., at819. 
31Id., at820. 
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the use of force."
32
Stromseth offers a defense of the ability of the UN Charter to 
"provide a viable and stabilizing framework for addressing threats to peace and 
security" and suggests three reasons for her conclusions regarding the premature 
announcement of the death of the charter.
33
 The first of her arguments mirrors that of 
John Woo as Stromseth argues that: 
 
"based on the language of the Security Council Resolution 1441 and the 
resolutions and practice that preceded it, the United States, and its allies could 
plausibly argue that the Security Council had acknowledged the seriousness of 
the situations and had recognized-or at least had agreed to disagree over-the 
legal theory that force could be used in response to Iraq's 'material breach' of 
the disarmament obligations imposed by the Security Council after the 1991 
Gulf War."
34
 
 
The second argument made by Stromseth suggests that although Article 2(4) is 
consistently undermined, the core of the article is still alive as there is no 
disagreement regarding the illegality of wars of territorial expansion and conquest.
35
 
She goes on to articulate that the liveliness of the core of this article places the 
"burden of justification on those who would resort to force" which ultimately affects 
state decision making.
36
 The third argument put forth by Stromseth suggests that the 
UN Charter is capable of evolving to meet the new threats to international peace and 
security and that the drafters of the Charter designed it to do just that.
37
Stromseth 
articulates that states have a duty to combat terrorism and it is of paramount 
importance that the international legal system adapt to these new threats in order to 
remain a significant player in what is sure to be a tumultuous period of global 
affairs.
38
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33Id., at629. 
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These perspective on the 2003 invasion of Iraq that deem it legal and 
legitimate or just suggest a very peculiar understanding of law, politics, and the 
relationship between them. It would seem that the type of politics discussed in the 
previous arguments refer to the protection of national interests through military 
action. In this regard the "political" objectives of the United States would be the 
protection of its national security and the deterrence of future loss of life among its 
citizens through addressing the perceived potential Iraqi threats. 
 
What is the Relationship betweenInternational Law and Politics? 
Thus, the legitimization of these actions by the United States after the fact, 
suggests an inferiority of international law to national interests. International law, in 
this situation, was not utilized as an instrument in the pursuit of normative objectives, 
or as an almighty reference point prior to taking action, but rather as a means of 
defending the actions that the United States deemed necessary. In this situation 
International could be defined as a legitimizing agent for political actions providing 
all lawful justification for the actions of the United States. This use of international 
law after the fact however suggests something in itself. It suggests that international 
law is not seen by the United States as a nuisance that should just be disregarded if it 
gets in the way of national interests, as RF Turner would suggest.
39
 It stands to reason 
that the United States does in fact exert effort in making sure that their actions are 
deemed lawful.In this regard compliance with international law would be a political 
interest would naturally vary between states. Similarly, it would stand to reason, that 
non-global powers or developing states would comply with international law for the 
most part out of reciprocity or the possibility of impending sanctions or military 
action. On the other hand, it would make sense that the reasoning global hegemons 
would employ for compliance with international law would be the alignment of this 
particular political interest with their other related interests. In this case, the global 
powers would be complying with international law simply because it wasn’t in its 
interest not to.  As Goldsmith and Posner argue, "[t]he U.S. government is not hostile 
to international law as such and continues to make and comply with international law 
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when doing so is in its interest."
40
  It is important to note that this perspective is the 
case regarding the United States, however in the case of other lesser global powers 
such as, the politically and economically influential Germany; where compliance with 
international law is not only perceived as democratic but "international law and 
democracy are an inseparable pair."
41
 
This understanding lines up with the statements made by former President 
George W. Bush during the 2004 State of the Union, where he clearly outlined the US 
America will never seek a permission slip to perspective on the rule of law by saying "
nternational irticular understanding of This pa 
42
defend the security of our people."
law does not disregard its importance altogether, however it does subordinate 
international law to political objectives and values individual interests and normative 
objectives above the preservation of the rule of law. It is important to note that this 
particular perspective on international law cannot be adopted by just any state and this 
exceptionalism can be attributed to the belief that "the United States is the only 800-
pound gorilla left on the block, and so gets to make the rules; and if a little thing like 
international law gets in the way…well, what's a thing like the rule of law between 
friends anyway?"
43
 Goldsmith and Posner argue that wealthy liberal democracies tend 
to be unenthusiastic about international law but that the United States is especially 
unenthusiastic given its current standing following the fall of the Soviet Union.
44
They 
go on to say that "Although the United States continued to seek international 
legalization, it demanded immunization when the legalization would harm American 
interests."
45
This lines up with the argument that the application of international law is 
uneven given the discrepancy between the legal notion that all sovereign states are 
equal and the actuality of the international arena which suggests that this legal notion 
could not be further from the truth. Given the anarchic nature of the international 
system, it would make sense that the law would be applied unevenly as even in the 
presence of international institutions with perceived authority over global affairs, one 
cannot simply ignore the power dynamics at play. This is to say that if a global 
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superpower wishes to circumvent international law, or bend international law, or even 
extend its own domestic laws into the international sphere, who would or could stop 
this from happening?  Noam Chomsky would argue that the United States simply 
disregarded international law altogether which is fitting given that the United States 
views international law as "an annoying encumbrance."
46
As Franck suggests, "the 
failure of the UN Charter's normative system is tantamount to the inability of any rule, 
such as that set out in Article 2(4), in itself to have much control over the behavior of 
states. National self-interest, particularly the national self interest of the super-Powers, 
has usually won out over treaty obligations."
47
 This particular perspective seems 
grounded in pragmatism as the enforcement and respect of international law often 
seems drowned out by the day to day activities of the global political machine. 
However, this supposed disregard is hard to visualize, given the manner in 
which both the United States and the United Kingdom have attempted to explain and 
justify their actions using international legal terms. International law is not 
subordinated in this perspective; in fact it is used as a redeemer of sorts. Although 
proponents of this particular perspective cite the importance of maintaining peace and 
security and the prevention of loss of life, the actions taken during the Iraq war are 
defended on legal grounds.  
The legitimacy of invasion of Iraq is also premised on the legality of the 
actions taken in response to perceived violations to the relevant Security Council 
resolutions as well as a legal exercise of an inherent right of self-defense. In this 
perspective, the legitimacy of the invasion of Iraq, although political in nature, is 
premised on the legality of the actions taken by the United States. 
The perspective adopted by Franck as well Taft and Buchwald argues that 
legal reasoning is not and cannot be separate from moral and political discourse, is 
defined as legal realism
48
 and is very much a pragmatic approach to law adopted by 
these authors. As Rues-Smit articulates, realist thought "treats politics as a struggle 
for material power between sovereign states, and law as either irrelevant or a simple 
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reflection of the prevailing balance of power."
49
 This stems from the notion that states 
are rational unitary actors in the international arena, who are involved in a continuous 
struggle with each other to maximize their relative material power. In this regard, 
"they are unchanging entities with clearly defined national interests that take 
precedence over the good of international society as a whole."
50
International law can 
thus be seen as "epiphenomenal": as it rests on power but when confronted with the 
actions of determined states it proves to be weak and ineffectual.
51
 This realist 
perspective suggests that politics consists merely of strategic, utility maximizing 
action, and that law is simply a set of regulatory rules. However this perspective 
cannot "account for the obligatory force of international law, for the fact that states by 
and large accept legal rules as binding even in the absence of centralized enforcement 
mechanisms."
52
Realists tend to respond to this criticism by suggesting that said 
obligation stems from the consent of states, however this response fails to address 
why "states regard consent as obligation inducing"
53
 or discuss the fact that states can 
be held accountable regardless of their consent in the case of customary law.
54
Shiner 
and Williams also illustrate the positive aspects of the interconnectivity of politics and 
international law, by arguing that states comply with international law out of their 
own political self-interests.
55
 Shiner and Williams also went on to argue that 
customary law does not only reflect self-interested state behavior but also “genuine 
cooperation or coordination” between pairs or groups of states.56 
What is important to note here, is not the balance struck between law and 
politics within this school of thought but rather that regardless of the definitions of 
law and politics, there exists an understanding that the moral and political factors that 
influence law are inescapable. As Fuller illustrates, in the case of legal realism, the 
practicality of this approach stems from the perspective that law is very much affected 
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by moral, political, and social conflicts, and denying this has truly adverse 
ramifications on law as an institution.
57
Given the advanced degree of 
interconnectivity between law and politics within this realist perspective, we can 
extrapolate that politics and law are not only intertwined as many would suggest, but 
also inseparable and possibly indistinguishable from one another in real world 
situations. The authors in this section when faced with a real world situation were 
seemingly unable to resort to solely legal terminology and assess the situation and 
instead opted for the use of political vernacular and reasoning. 
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Illegal but Legitimate: 
Legitimacy takes on a much more normative shape in this perspective as the 
law is no longer propped up but rather torn down for its inadequacies and 
obsoleteness. Proponents of this perspective would thus not argue that the Security 
Council provided authorization, that there were legal grounds for self defense, or even 
that the invasion was in fact lawful. Slaughter and Feinstein are more preoccupied 
with their arguments regarding "Duty to Prevent" and the ways in which this proposed 
principle justifies the invasion of Iraq. This particular principle suggests an obligation 
on powerful democratic states to address global threats and the undemocratic systems 
that spawn said threats.
58 
Was the Invasion of Iraq Just? 
 In this particular perspective, the legitimacy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq is 
premised on the normative objectives that said invasion aimed to fulfill. The legality 
of the war takes a back seat to the political objectives at play. As Anne-Marie 
Slaughter articulates the course of action taken by the Bush administration can be 
called "illegal but legitimate."
59
 In this regard, attempts made to justify the invasion 
rarely focused on producing legal arguments or justification but rather exposing flaws 
in the law, that require improvement that this incident clearly pointed out. 
International Law is thus no longer perceived in terms of the sanctity that a global rule 
of law entails but rather as a malleable political instrument. This is not to say that this 
perspective marked a complete and utter abandonment of international law, as politics 
is seen as the salvation for international law through its utilization towards normative 
objectives. Slaughter illustrates this point by drawing parallels between the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and the intervention in Kosovo following the US circumvention of 
the United Nations at the turn of the century as well as the conclusion reached by the 
International Commission on Kosovo.
60
 It is also important to note that despite fears 
that the intervention in Kosovo would irreparably damage the United Nations and lead 
                                                           
Jan/Feb ,ORKYEW N-FFAIRSAOREIGN  F , A Duty to PreventMarie Slaughter, -Lee Feinstein, and Anne
58
.2004  
N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33.  ,Good Reasons for Going around the UNMarie Slaughter, -Anne
59
 
60
Id. 
08 
 
to it suffering a fate similar to the League of Nations; the UN remained intact. In fact 
as Antony Anghie argues, preemptive self-defense has furthered the causes that the 
United Nations is concerned with.
61
  The survival of the United Nations despite the 
undermining of the prohibition of use of force may suggest that the "prohibition on 
the use of force is not a necessary condition to the legal character of the international 
order” as Jean d'Aspremont articulates.62  He also goes on to argue that the prohibition 
on use of force may in fact hinder the collective security system and demote it to "a 
mere political forum where questions of peace and security are discussed but no 
police measure can be taken."
63
 This perspective suggests that use of force exists in a 
grey area which explains why the International Court of Justice has been so reluctant 
to defend a black and white understanding of its prohibition.
64
  Regardless of whether 
this perspective is entirely accurate, it is important to derive the effect that suggesting 
legal principles are clear cut has on the international legal system. 
As Illustrated in We are teachers of International Law, "For every letter to the 
paper arguing that the war was legal or illegal, there was another arguing that might 
makes right: international law is simply irrelevant."
65
 It is thus important to reaffirm 
that the Iraq War represents a schism in the international legal community in terms of 
legitimacy as well as legality. The question of legitimacy is a multifaceted one as 
simply structuring an argument around legitimacy rather than legality suggests a 
perspective on international law that deems it inferior to political ends. This is the 
case that Slaughter and Feinstein make in A Duty to Prevent, where the authors trace 
the legitimacy of the use of force from: the fulfillment of the Catholic doctrine, 
expansion of empires, or the unification of a nation, to the United Nations Charter and 
the restrictions placed on use of force.
66
 The United Nations restricts the legitimacy of 
use of force to individual or collective self defense and has attempted to transfer a 
large extent of the control of self-defense from individual states to the Security 
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Council.
67
 States still retain their inherent right to self-defense, however according to 
articles 2(4), 51, and Chapter 7, the Security Council acts as the mechanism of 
authorizing the legitimate use of force. In the case of the 2003 Iraq War, Slaughter 
and Feinstein derogate from the arguments made by Woo and do not cite previous 
Security Council resolutions in an attempt to justify the invasion using legal 
arguments. In fact, the authors further derogate from Woo's arguments by not citing 
the principle of self-defense in the UN Charter as a legal justification. Feinstein and 
Slaughter instead argue that the United Nations Charter is outdated and unequipped to 
handle an issue such as the Iraq War and thus an amendment to these rules or a 
rewriting altogether is necessary.
68
  The authors cite the changing nature of war as the 
reasoning for this call for the revitalization of the laws regarding use of force as the 
threat of armed attack has moved away from standing armies to terrorist organizations 
and the battlefield no longer has clear boundaries.
69
 There is a clear recognition by the 
authors that the current legal principles at play do not provide a sufficient legal 
framework for what took place in Iraq in 2003 and thus what occurred becomes a 
question of legitimacy.
70
As articulated by Nijman, "the war might have been illegal 
but it was politically justifiable because of a vital political interest."
71
 Slaughter 
reaffirms that the legitimization of the intervention in Iraq can come about through the 
locating of weapons of mass destruction, or even simply through the "Iraqi people 
welcoming the intervention."
72
 Slaughter believes that global interests take primacy 
over the rule of law and undermines the necessity of UN approval for use of force to 
be justified citing the idle nature of the Security Council during the Cold War as an 
example.
73
 
A shift in the mechanics of modern day warfare has supposedly rendered the 
legal principles drafted at the end of the Second World War obsolete and the law must 
thus evolve to allow for the preemptive use of force once a threat has been 
identified.
74
 The authors thus introduce a concept that they refer to as "a duty to 
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prevent", which suggests that states that identify clear and present threats, such as the 
acquiring of weapons of mass destruction by a closed government, must strike first 
before an attack is left to occur.
75
 The authors introduced this concept as a response to 
responsibility to protect or humanitarian intervention as legal principles that often 
justify extraordinary acts that seemingly create legal grey areas.
76 
This particular discussion regarding the legitimacy of the Iraq War illustrates the 
power dynamics of the relationship between international law and politics where the 
international rule of law is not respected and a more critical approach to the law is 
utilized. In this view, an international rule of law governing the international arena, 
guaranteeing justice for all is not the end game. This perception of international law 
as an instrument is one that Slaughter illustrates.She believes international law aims to 
regulate the interactions between States and their citizens and should aim to develop 
domestic institutions, strengthen states, and encourage transnational cooperation in 
the face of international threats.
77
International law is viewed as a tool that is used to 
achieve normative objectives such as international peace and security, the prevention 
of loss of life or damages to civilians, and the fulfillment of national objectives. And 
like any tool, if it becomes outdated or incapable of fulfilling the task required, it is 
replaced by a better one. Feinstein and Slaughter argue that DTP is that better tool and 
can meet the demands of today's world. However, this particular tool comes with a 
very specific set of instructions that raise a few questions. For instance, the use of the 
term "closed society" by the authors proves to be an important detail of this proposed 
legal principle given that Feinstein and Slaughter see it as the key to ensuring the 
success of this principle
78
. Closed societies or undemocratic nations supposedly lack 
the system of checks and balances necessary for the just utilization of duty to prevent 
and thus this principle should not extend to them.
79
 This caveat within DTP is meant 
to eliminate the dangers that this principle could ultimately lead to if utilized by 
undemocratic states. One cannot help but draw parallels between this particular 
political distinction within a legal principle and the distinction between civilized and 
                                                           
75
Supra note 58, at 137. 
76
Id. 
Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, the White, -Marie Slaughter and William Burke-Anne
77
(2006).  ,327 Harv. Int'l LJ, 47 European Way of Law 
78
Supra note 58, at 137. 
79
Id. 
20 
 
uncivilized nations during the formation of international law. 
 
The malicious ways in which duty to prevent could be utilized are numerous 
and the authors recognize this. If perverted, duty to prevent could be used to justify 
attacking a state under the guise of a supposed perceived threat that could later be 
found to not have existed in the first place, such as a supposed stockpile of weapons 
of mass destruction. The lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq might render this 
distinction between democratic states with proper institutions and closed societies 
moot given that it was a democratic state that ultimately failed to prove that the 
perceived threat was real.  
 It would seem that politics not only dominates international law but political 
factors seek to dictate the formation and application of legal principles. Could this 
particular perspective suggest that international law is just an extension of politics? 
This advanced intersection between international law and politics is not necessarily 
the undoing of international law but rather a departure from a positivist perspective on 
the law. As Goldsmith and Posner argue, "international law is a part of politics and 
not a way of eliminating it" and the failure of the advocates of international law to see 
this has hindered its development." 
80
 They further supplement this argument by 
saying that it would seem that "international law has no life of its own, has no special 
normative authority; it is just the working out of relations among states, as they deal 
with relatively discrete problems of international cooperation."
81 
What is the Relationship between International Law and Politics? 
Despite sharing much of the core principles of realism, such as holding the 
state as the primary unit of analysis within an international anarchic system, 
"neoliberals are far less dismissive of international law than their realist 
counterparts."
82
This is to say that despite the nature of Feinstein and Slaughter's 
arguments being centered on legitimacy, the authors focused a great deal on the 
formation of a legal principle that would justify the actions of the United States in the 
eyes of the law. It is thus important to view the Iraq War as another test for 
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international law which it could either pass or fail
83
, rather than the proverbial straw 
that broke the camel's back. A more important point of focus would be the 
relationship between political legitimacy and legality, as had the invasion of Iraq been 
authorized by the Security Council, thus ending the debate about legality, would that 
have guaranteed its legitimacy? And if so, what would that mean for international 
law? Slaughter would have us believe that legitimacy is more important than legality, 
and if established, can brings about legality as she describes the issue of unauthorized 
use of force by stating that " Practices have to evolve without formal amendment.”84 
She goes on to say that this would be "the lesson that the United Nations and all of us 
should draw from this crisis. Overall, everyone involved is still playing by the rules. 
But depending on what we find in Iraq, the rules may have to evolve, so that what is 
legitimate is also legal."
85
Slaughter falls within the scope of liberal legal thought; as 
in addition to recognizing the effects of domestic and international politics on 
international law, in the same manner as realists, Slaughter goes a step further and 
suggests that there exists a distinction between members of the international 
community. She believes there are key players within the international arena that are 
capable of influencing the law through their actions and dominance over global affairs 
and this is very much in line with liberal legal thought which recognizes the alignment 
of political and legal factors.
86
 Furthermore, Slaughter articulates that given the 
skewed nature of the contributions of certain players within the international 
community that democratic states are more likely to abide by international legal 
obligations than undemocratic states
87
 and this perspective would justify the unequal 
use of duty to prevent. In this perspective, international law is not an end in itself, and 
the sanctity of the rule of law is not something that is meant to be protected and 
perpetuated. In this perspective, international law is meant to facilitate peace and 
security and in the instances where the law fails to do so, then the law should be 
amended to reflect the needs of today's world. These "needs" are of course political 
needs given that the state is the main player within the international arena. In this 
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liberal perspective, law is meant to serve democratic ideals, as evident in Slaughter's 
arguments regarding DTP which suggest that the law should not serve undemocratic 
states or "closed Societies."
88
 This perspective suggests that international law is 
malleable and the ways in which it is warped and wrapped in and around politics are 
many. Given that the powerful democratic states dominate the political arena, it is no 
surprise that this dominance would spill over into international law. The end result is 
an erosion of the barriers between international law and politics, where states can 
utilize both instruments in ways that suit their needs and the needs of global situations 
that arise. It is important to note that this particular erosion renders the assessment of 
the conflict of Iraq using a distinctly legal approach impossible and the authors within 
this section werecomfortable invoking political terms and concepts. 
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Illegal and Illegitimate: 
 
In this particular perspective, the included authors argue the 2003 Iraq War 
was unlawful and illegitimate given that the Security Council very clearly opposed the 
intervention and in no way provided authorization as illustrated by Richard Falk.
89
In 
addition to addressing the lack of Security Council authorization, Falk also discusses 
the preemptive self-defense argument as well as the arguments relating to Iraq's 
failure to comply with the Security Council disarmament resolutions.
90
 The failure of 
Iraq to comply with their disarmament obligations was premised on the understanding 
that Iraq was harboring WMD's, which has history has shown, was not the case. As 
Falk describes, had Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, wouldn’t the regime have 
used them in order to ensure the survival of the regime?
91
 
Were There Legal Grounds for Self-Defense? 
In regards to the question of self-defense, one must first examine the 
conventional use of this legal principle as outlined in the United Nations Charter as 
well the more controversial use of self-defense which deals with preemption. 
Although Written before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Frederic Megret's article discusses 
the conventional understanding of self-defense in the aftermath of the 2001 
September 11
th
 Attacks. Megret supplements Falk's arguments greatly by articulating 
the ways in which the US argument regarding self-defense in the conventional sense 
are much more convincing in the context of Afghanistan.
92
Megret, in regards to the 
9/11 attacks, focuses on self-defense and whether the requirements specified in the 
UN Charter have been met. Frederic Megret asks an important question by stating 
that, "even if a right of self-defense can somehow be squeezed out of the Charter in 
the present circumstances…the question, in other words, may be less whether self-
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defense is legal than what it means to say that it is legal in terms of law's systematic 
sustainability."
93 
In his arguments regarding the requirements for self-defense, Megret argued 
that despite the use of box cutters and not actual "arms" during the attacks September 
11
th
, 2001, the attack could still be considered given the use of a commercial airplane 
as a weapon as well as the legal precedent derived from the storming of the US 
embassy in Tehran in 1979 being considered an armed attack.
94
 He also states that 
despite the adoption of Security Council resolutions on the 12
th
 of September, 2001as 
well as two weeks later; it could be argued that the resolutions failed to take the 
necessary measures to restore international peace and security.
95
 This is a difficult 
point to argue for a number of reasons: the first reason is that it is not explicitly stated 
that the measures taken by the Security Council are required to be military actions, 
and Secondly, the effectiveness of said actions in maintaining international peace and 
security can only be determined retrospectively. Assuming however, that the 
requirements for legal self-defense were satisfied, and the controversial element of 
anticipatory or preemptive self defense was not invoked, was the use of force by the 
United States against Iraq Legal? Megret argues no, given the "temporal and spatial 
coordinates of self-defense."
96
 
In regards to the temporal requirements, self-defense should only be used to 
repel an armed attack and only when it is absolutely necessary and "anticipatory self 
defense is not really self-defense at all."
97
 Furthermore, acts of self-defense that do 
not occur relatively immediately look very much like reprisals which are strictly 
prohibited given that they simply constitute acts of aggression. As Falk argues, the 
arguments justifying the 2003 Iraq War by contrast to Afghanistan were unconvincing 
to say the least.
98
 Falk argues that an intervention in Afghanistan made much more 
sense relatively given the presence of Al-Qaida (who claimed responsibility) 
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strongholds.
99
This is where the issue of semantics comes in to play, as Megret argues 
that simply referring to the actions taken by the United States in response to the 
September 11
th
 attacks as a "'War' on Terror" carries significant weight.
100
 This 
constitutes a prime example of the ways in which political tools such as rhetoric are 
used to provide legitimacy or guarantee legality of certain actions. War is very much a 
loaded term, and if the war on terror is seen as a war, then temporal restrictions do not 
necessarily apply.
101
 War is also very much an ongoing process and there are points in 
between the violence that are relatively calmer, in that regard, self-defense could be 
perceived as ongoing process as well.
102
 The political discourse surrounding the 
attacks on the United States could thus legitimize acts of aggression through the 
removal of the temporal requirements of the right to self-defense. 
In regards to the spatial requirements, a state acting in self-defense would have 
to identify a clear perpetrator in order to engage and individual or collective self-
defense, and said target would have to be a state according to the requirements of 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
103
 Ideally, the identification of a clear 
perpetrator would require providing irrefutable evidence to justify such a long and 
vigorous campaign and not simply stating that sufficient intelligence had been 
gathered.
104
 This deadlock often end in favor of the political side, as the protection of 
key sources as well as state secrets paramount to national security have primacy over 
due process.Megret goes on to argue that a link between a state and the terrorist group 
guilty of an attack would have to be established and said state would have to be 
sponsoring the terrorist group and not simply harboring them or failing to eradicate 
them.
105
 
 In regards to preemptive self-defense, Falk argues that a legitimate and 
imminent threat was not present. In regards to the arguments put forth by the United 
States/United Kingdom, regarding violations of the Security Council Resolutions 
relating to Iraq; thesupposed failure of Iraq to comply with their disarmament 
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obligations was premised on the understanding that Iraq was harboring WMD's, 
which has history has shown, was not the case. As Falk describes, had Iraq had 
weapons of mass destruction, wouldn’t the regime have used them in order to ensure 
the survival of the regime?
106
 The fact that weapons of mass destruction were not used 
suggested that they either did not exist or that they did in factexist and Iraq had no 
intention of ever using them.
107
 Both ways this fact greatly undermines the imminent 
threat argument as well as the preemptive self-defense argument.  
Was the Invasion Lawful/Just? 
The important element to derive from the aforementioned arguments regarding 
the legality of the events is the primacy of national interests and the political rhetoric 
used to achieve said interests overthe rule of law. In terms of the legitimacy of use of 
force that does not meet temporal or spatial requirements of self-defense or have 
otherwise been authorized by the Security Council; becomes a question of political 
motives.. In the case of the US response to 9/11, Megret argues that this constitutes 
war as a "perversion of justice" through the muddling of the line between justice and 
revenge. Falk argues that even though"contested uses of force under the Charter are 
'illegal, yet illegitimate'" which is very much the case of Iraq given the lack of 
Security Council authorization and WMD's, the intervention could still be judged 
legitimate for humanitarian purposes.
108
. Had the rule of law been disregarded and the 
use of force in this particular case occurred for humanitarian purposes, then the acts 
may have been deemed legitimate enough to redeem their illegality
109
In regards to the 
arguments suggesting humanitarian intervention; Falk argues that "the claimed 
humanitarian benefits resulting from the war were emphasized by American officials 
as a way to circumvent the legality of the American-led recourse to force."
110
 Falk 
also goes on to argue that "such post hoc efforts at legalization should not be accorded 
much respect" especially in the case of a major war.
111
This process by the United 
States in particular, marks a departure from the justices supposedly guaranteed by a 
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strong international legal system to a system where powerful states take matters into 
their own hands and bend the laws around them in order to legitimize their actions. In 
this regard, the law is being used as a political instrument to serve a larger purpose 
that aligns with the interests of the global hegemon.  
What is the Relationship between International Law and Politics? 
This process however might be easier said than done as Stephen Toope argues that the 
influence that global hegemons singlehandedly have on international law may be 
somewhat exaggerated.
112
Toope argues that the although the US is a hegemon, the 
largest most powerful one in fact, it is an ineffective one in terms of bending 
international law to its will.
113
 He attributes this ineffectiveness to a number of 
reasons such as "the imposition of normative constraints even upon the most powerful 
members of international society."
114
 This is too say, that if the rule of law has any 
power whatsoever than the international community should be entirely able to curtail 
the "entirely self-interested impulses of the powerful."
115
 This suggests that 
international law, in terms of a rule of law, requires the political action of states to 
guarantee its protection from political perversion at the hands of a global superpower. 
This legal constructivist claim suggests that the status quo is not an inevitability of the 
international system where the world had no choice but to arrive at this conclusion, 
but rather that the status quo is a human construct built up through years of political 
and social practices. In this perspective, smaller states are just as capable, if not more 
capable, of building a different system through different practices. 
Toope argues that this power that the international community supposedly possesses 
can be found in international customary law as opposed to international treaties, given 
that treaties reflect to a large extent the unequal bargaining power of global 
hegemons.
116
 Customary international law, on the other hand, contains many 
instances of non-hegemonic states giving "rise to norms that may not be supported by 
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all powerful states.
117
" Seeing as how the development of international customary law 
through the introduction of new norms does not require the consent of all states, and 
the "persistent objector" rule is becoming increasingly obsolete; the power of the 
United States in preventing new customs from emerging is very much limited in 
Toope's perspective.
118
Toope cites the failed persistent objection of the United States 
to an emerging custom, which was eventually codified, regarding state jurisdiction 
over Arctic waters in the 1970s as a precursor to the decline of US hegemonic power 
over international law.
119
He goes on to argue that the contribution of weaker states to 
customary law is better facilitated by the widespread understanding that official 
statements constitute state practice.
120
 This concept, as Rues-Smit articulates, seems 
to undermine the realist notion; that law is an instrument of global powers, which 
"neglects to investigate the ways in which it is used by the weak to achieve more 
advantageous outcomes."
121
 
He supplements his arguments by suggesting that the American government 
and the American people have historically been "ambivalent about the American role 
in world affairs."
122
 Said ambivalence supposedly culminates in a United States that 
does not act as a hegemon often, however this point is less about the ineffectiveness 
of the US in influencing international law and more about its general lack of concern 
with it.Toope also goes on to describe a redefinition of opiniojuristhat suggests that 
states do not necessarily need to consent in order to be bound by international 
customary law.
123
Toope's perspective undermines the understanding that the 
effectiveness of international law is directly correlated to the alignment of the rule of 
law with the political interests of the global super powers. Neglecting the 
overwhelming potential for perversion of the law, the supposed ineffectiveness of the 
US in bending international law to its will as well as its disinterest in the international 
legal system alone is enough to dispel the notion that the global superpower could be 
the champion of international law. 
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As far as influence over legality, Toope would argue that the United States is 
incapable of shaping the law in its own image or even stopping changes in the law 
that act against its interest.
124
 In regards to legitimacy however, the US has had far 
more success, given its ability to influence other global powers into allying with the 
US in its pursuits. It stands to reason, that the US is much more concerned with 
legitimacy than it is with legality, given its historic disinterest with international 
law.
125
 Legitimacy, in the US perspective, is a far more useful instrument given that it 
often provides more justification than the law. This understanding is premised on the 
belief that the law or the rule of law is not the end result but rather a path among 
many to the end. As Habermas argues, legitimacy is based on the correspondence of 
values between the ruler and the ruled
126
 and in the case of 2003 invasion of Iraq said 
correspondence is most certainly not present. Aside from the supposed illegality of 
the invasion, the lack of evidence provided to justify the attack and the failure to 
locate weapons of mass destruction; the "perception" regarding this invasion has 
largely been that it was illegitimate.  This is particularly important as Toope argues 
that "law depends for its power on congruence with social practice matched with 
perceptions of legitimacy."
127
 This understanding of international law places much 
weight on actions taken by states as well as their political perceptions.  
An argument could be extracted from his points in support of the principle of 
preemptive self-defense, which could potentially legitimize the actions taken by the 
United States against Iraq, as he argues that "when law fosters allegiance, through the 
process of its creation and its rhetorical persuasiveness, it creates its 'own binding 
effect.'"
128
 The legitimization of the US actions through the determining of their 
legality with the introduction of this principle; would be hinged upon the perception 
of the international community towards this new legal principle. This positively 
correlated relationship between law and legitimacy poses potential dangers. As in this 
regard, a state could take action towards actualizing its interests and through political 
pressure garner widespread support for said action as a legitimate and thus legal act. It 
stands to reason that the United States as the leading global superpower, through its 
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economic, strategic, and political prowess, could potentially introduce legal principles 
that reshape international law such as anticipatory or preemptive self-defense.  
Proponents of this particular perspective on the issue value the sanctity of the 
law above all despite any perceived flaws within the legal system. This particular 
legal positivist perspective would suggest a direct correlation between legality and 
legitimacy where legality provides for legitimacy. In this regard, a political action 
could not be the justifier, and the law would be the only appropriate point of reference 
for determining if an action was just or unjust. The validity of legal norms would thus 
depend on the legitimate manner in which it came about and not on the successes of 
law in solving international issues. This is to say that how the law comes about is just 
as important as the law itself.That is to say that if the law was created legally by a 
legitimate authority, it is still law, even if it is ineffective or flawed.
129 
The ends would not justify the means in this perspective and international 
legal principles could thus not be forced into fruition through political or illegitimate 
means. Regardless of whether global powers could will international legal principles 
into creation or not; it is important to derive that politics requires law in order to be 
deemed legitimate while law requires "proper politics" in order to be deemed 
legitimate as well. Toope adopts a constructivist view which suggests that 
international politics is a rule-governed as well as a rule-constitutive form of action 
and reason and international law is a central component of the normative structures 
that are produced by, and constitutive of, such politics.
130
 In this regard, "International 
law is central to this framework, and like politics, constructivists see it as ‘a broad 
social phenomenon deeply embedded in the practices, beliefs, and traditions of 
societies, and shaped by interaction among societies.'"
131
The difficulty here arises in 
distinguishing between the two given how highly interconnected and essential to one 
another they both are. Needless to say, the authors in this section recognized said 
difficulty and opted instead for a multifaceted approach that utilized both political and 
legal reasoning within their assessment of the legality and legitimacy of this situation. 
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Legal but Illegitimate: 
The understanding of legality and legitimacy that suggests positive 
correlations between the two is not shared by JanneNijman who proposes that they 
could at times be negatively correlated.
132
 That isto say that legality and legitimacy as 
well as illegality and illegitimacy do not go hand in hand. This particular 
understanding is premised on an understanding of international law that is to a large 
extent a departure from formal legality. As Nijman argues, "Rather than to stick to the 
level of formal legality and the relative indeterminacy of the law as a scheme of 
interpretation, international lawyers participating in the debate must engage with 
moral and political arguments regarding the use of force."
133
 Needless to say, Nijman 
does not dwell on the presence of authorization from the Security Council or even the 
debate surrounding anticipatory self-defense. Nijman chooses to focus on the 
understanding of legality that gives weight to the normative actions taken by global 
leaders. 
Was the Invasion of Iraq Lawful/Just? 
The building of legal principles on political grounds is not a particularly new 
principle given that customary international law is made up entirely on political 
grounds manifested through state practice and official governmental statements. The 
issue with the utilizing a political foundation for the formation of international law 
arises when the legal principles introduced are the product of individual state interests 
rather that shared normative values within the international community. This 
circumstance might seem difficult, as Toope articulated, given the unpersuasive 
nature of the US as a global hegemon; however, as Toope also states, no nation has 
ever been as powerful as the United States is now.
134
 In regards to the Iraq War and 
the US support for preemptive self-defense, one can observe a controversial emerging 
principle being pushed towards the forefront of the understanding of the legality of 
the use of force. This particular principle restores archaic components of international 
relations and integrates them with the modern understanding of the prohibition on use 
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of force. In this case, the 2003 invasion of Iraq could be deemed as legal but 
illegitimate.  
This perspective is very much in line with Third World Approaches to 
International Law or TWAIL. The field identifies and analyzes the issues within 
international law from a third world approach. As Fidler defines it, “[TWAIL] 
critically analyzes international law to promote a more just and equitable approach to 
the countries and peoples of the developing world.” 135 TWAIL however often 
extends beyond just being an academic field as some scholars, such as TWAIL 
scholar Antony Anghie, would argue that TWAIL could almost be viewed as a 
political movement that aims to mitigate the challenges that International Law 
presents to the Third World.
136
 
As Antony Anghie articulates, preemption within the context of Iraq, "resurrects a 
very old set of ideas that were articulated at the beginning of the modern discipline of 
international law."
137
 The reintroduction of these norms marks a potential regression 
of international law to the tumultuous early years of its formation, which act to 
reassert the aforementioned inherent flaws within it. The argument Anghie puts forth 
suggests that the 2003 invasion of Iraq may in fact be lawful, due to inherent biases 
within international law, but that does not make it legitimate or just.
138
 
 
Nijman arrives at a similar conclusion in a manner that marks a transition from 
the positivist understanding manifested in contemporary Jus Ad Bellum, outlined in 
the charter as well as customary law, to the "just war" doctrine.
139
 This particular 
transition is not without its merit as Nijman reminds us that "the just war doctrine 
offers a decision-making model on the use of force that has been developed by 
political leaders, their advisors, and critics in over 2000 years."
140
 This argument may 
be particularly difficult to grasp as it suggests that the legality of the use of force in 
this context would have to be derived from politicians and not international lawyers or 
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from political criteria and normative values as opposed to a formalist system of the 
rule of law. Placing such power over international law in the hands of politicians 
potentially ushers in a system of "might makes right" in determining the legality of 
certain actions through the shaping of widely accepted legal principles. 
 In the case of Iraq, the legality of the actions could thus be asserted, but that 
begs the question, what about the legitimacy of the invasion? In order for a war to be 
waged legitimately, it would need to have satisfied the following six criteria: a just 
cause, be waged by a legitimate authority, be waged for the right reasons, be a last 
resort, have a serious chance of success, and not run the risk of bringing about a 
greater evil or chaos.
141
 Many of these points however can only be displayed 
retroactively and in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, they were not displayed at 
all. As Nijman illustrates, one need only look to the lack of a "well developed 'state 
building' plan for the post-war period" which increased the risk of a bringing about a 
greater evil as proof that the US did not satisfy the criteria.
142
 Motives such as oil or 
corporate instances would not constitute a right reason in the normative sense, given 
that the perpetrators of the invasion did not clearly outline this prior to taking action. 
The absence of weapons of mass destruction in the after math of the invasion as well 
as the failure to prove that the invasion was in fact a last resort act would thus lead to 
the conclusion that the "Iraq War" must be deemed as illegitimate despite even if 
some argue its legality. 
What is the Relationship between International Law and Politics? 
In regards to what he believes to be an archaic use of an inherently biased legal 
principle, Anghie states that "[t]he re- emergence of these themes disturbingly 
illuminates the imperial dimensions of international law, and the enduring impact of 
imperialism in the international system."
143
 The reason for Anghie's establishment of 
a connection between preemption and imperialism is premised on Bush's National 
Security Strategy, and its focus on "Rogue States."
144
 These states, many of which 
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represent the "Axis of Evil" are the most susceptible to preemptive attack given that 
they allegedly sponsor or promote terrorism as well as the US belief that the solution 
to issues is the transformation of rogue states into democratic states as articulated by 
President George W. Bush in his speech at the 2004 Republican National Convention. 
145
 The connection to the imperialist history of international law can be reaffirmed by 
drawing parallels to the democratization of rogue states and the civilizing of savage or 
uncivilized nations as a guise for imperialist motives. In regards to the Iraq War, 
Anghie cites the pursuing of US interests under the pretext of a preemptive self 
defense in the face of a real threat as modern day imperialism.
146
 In addition to 
masking political motives, this perception of democracy as the panacea for global 
terrorism is used to justify the impartiality of international legal principles such as 
anticipatory self defense and duty to prevent which cannot be exercised by closed 
societies.
147
 It would seem that international law, in this context, is being utilized to 
perpetuate the democratization agenda, and oppress states that lack the institutions to 
be deemed capable of defending themselves legally. 
This is no surprise as these principles were clearly never meant to be applied equally 
among the entire international community and how could they? These principles are 
very much reliant on the political, economic, and military power that comes with 
being a global superpower. Anghie offers several arguments to illustrate the 
inherently impartial nature of preemptive self-defense which attempt to answer his 
own question regarding the topic, "What effect will the instantiation of pre-emption 
within the framework of international law have on some of the most fundamental 
tenets of international law?"
148
 
He asks us to take the examples of the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea, both 
of which are included in the "Axis of Evil", and apply the concept of preemptive self-
defense as a new understanding of an inherently sovereign right under the premise 
that all sovereign states are equal.
149
 Iran or North Korea could thus be argued to have 
been faced with a real threat following the invasion of fellow axis member Iraq, and 
thus had Iran attacked the United States preemptively. The very notion that either of 
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these nations could be lawfully permitted in attacking the United States is ludicrous in 
nature and asserts Anghie's argument that "even though self-defense is the most basic 
of sovereign rights, pre-emptive self-defense is a right that the United States intends 
to be confined only to itself and its allies."
150
  The principle of preemptive self-
defense thus undermines the supposed core principles of international such as 
sovereign equality and marks a departure from this normative concept to an 
understanding of international law that reflects the current structure of international 
relations. States are not equal within international relations, and some states with their 
political and economic prowess as well as their stockpiles of nuclear weapons are not 
on equal footing with developing nations. If notions such as preemptive self-defense 
are allowed to flourish, then the international system would regress to resemble the 
international legal system that was present among European states at the end of the 
nineteenth century.
151
 The implication that the certain legal principles were only 
meant for the US and its allies is not a farfetched one as Anghie provides a second 
illustration of these inherent imbalances within the legal system. Anghie draws our 
attention to the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice 
"regarding the legality of the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons."
152
 In this case, 
the court was unable to definitively determine that the use of nuclear weapons was in 
fact illegal following persuasive arguments by the United States and the United 
Kingdom on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense.
153
 This 
argument is in fact reaffirmed, As Anghie states, by the differing nature of the US 
approach to both Iraq and North Korea regarding the issue of WMDs. In the case of 
Iraq, the US suspected that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction but not actual 
nuclear weapons and took a very intense approach. However, in the case of North 
Korea, the US took a far more cautious approach given that it suspected North Korea 
actually possessed nuclear weapons. Anghie draws the conclusion that these differing 
approaches suggest "that the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons is 
essential to the deterrence of the United States."
154
 Iran could have thus justified its 
nuclear program or pursuit of nuclear weapons as an inherent right to self-defense 
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given that nuclear weapons are essential to self-defense in this regard. Furthermore, 
Iran as a member of the axis of evil could thus justify the development or acquisition 
of nuclear weapons further as a form of preemptive self-defense in order to avoid 
sharing a similar fate as Iraq. However, in reality the acquisition or development of 
nuclear weapons in any Third World state is likely to be construed as a threat to the 
United States and its allies and thus potentially warrant a preemptive attack. This 
asymmetrical application of the principle of self-defense and the prohibition on items 
supposedly necessary to self-defense is reaffirmed by the unequal application of the 
requirements of the Non-Proliferation treaty on states that do not yet possess nuclear 
weapons as well as the negative implications associated with withdrawing from the 
treaty. This distinction represents further impartialities within the international legal 
system and another departure from a positivist vision of an international rule of law. 
As Anghie states, "It is disconcerting that western attempts to create a new 
international law should so unerringly return to the colonial origins of the 
discipline."
155
 It would seem that international law in this regard is simply an 
instrument of imperialism exasperating the divide between the global powers and the 
third world under the guise of new and changing threats that the United Nations and 
the international legal system are unequipped to handle. However, Anghie remains 
cautiously optimistic suggesting that "third-world states and peoples, whatever the 
difficulties they suffer from, are not likely to acquiesce readily to the return of explicit 
imperialism."
156
 It would seem that any impartiality within the international legal 
system could be attributed to political imbalances and constructed hierarchies in the 
global system. On the other hand, said political imbalances and constructed 
hierarchies would be propped up by reaffirmed legal norms that came to be through 
state practice. Although this endless loop is very much a social or political construct, 
its effects on the international arena are not any less real. This cyclical construct 
however, suggests a muddled mixture of international law and politics, where both 
have lost their individuality and neither can exist without the other. 
 
Nijman illustrates the potential ramifications of inherently imperfect and biased laws 
given the suggested positive correlation between legality and legitimacy. That is to 
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say if a new law were to come into effect, it would be perceived as just or legitimate 
simply because it is lawful. This undermines the power of the legitimizing power of 
the international community in regards to international law. What is more troubling 
about this perspective is the potential ramifications for international law, as building 
legal principles on political grounds entirely opens the door for potentially malicious 
uses of the law.In this perspective, international law would no longer be portrayed as 
a moral compass that points true north and, given the perceived inherent flaws within 
international by critical theorists, this is not particularly surprising.Nijmanbuilds on 
the work of legal realism, in the recognition that the institution of law is very much 
reflective of the political world, by adopting a more reformative perspective on the 
international legal system.
157
Nijman differs from the realist legal theorists in that she 
doesn’t believe that the practical nature of the world today legitimizes the actions 
even if does legalize them and thus the reforms that she proposes are legal and not 
political in nature.
158
She goes on to illustrate three differing perspectives on the 
relationship between international law and politics and examines them closely in The 
Case of Iraq: International Law and Politics.
159
 The first understanding is that there 
exists an international rule of law that prevails over and constrains politics. The 
second is an understanding that international law and politics exist on equal footing 
and where there is no primacy of international law. Finally, the third understanding of 
the relationship between international law and politics is that the compliance with 
international law is an interest among many that a state takes into account.
160
Nijman 
offers a perspective on international law that recognizes the weight of global politics 
in shaping the law but suggests that the legal principles themselves are equally 
important. In this realist perspective, we can derive that politics and international law 
would be two sides of the same coin without one taking primacy over the other. The 
effects that each side has on the other are extensive and thus separation of the two for 
the purpose of assessing the situation would be futile. 
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Conclusion:  
The arguments articulated within this paper are thus a response to the 
dichotomization of law and politics by legal scholars aiming to quarantine law from 
politics as Rues-Smit illustrates.
161
 As discussed throughout this paper, the 
aforementioned interconnectivity of international law and politics that render them 
virtually indistinguishable from one another is not an inherently destructive quality 
given the degree of pragmatism that it adds to two highly theoretical concepts.This 
relationship between international and politics grounds both disciplines in practicality 
and offers more of an insight into global conflicts than either discipline separately. 
This position has become abundantly clear regardless of the perspective on the 
legality or legitimacy of the conflict in question as more and more authors from 
various schools of thought have adopted interdisciplinary approaches in their 
assessments of global conflicts. As Shiner and Williams argue that International law 
works “by integrating the study of international law with the realities of international 
politics.”162 This is an important balance to strike given that the theoretical nature of 
the legal principles of international law often seem detached from their real world 
applications.  
It is therefore unsurprising that the authors behind each distinct perspective 
resorted to political rhetoric within their respective legal assessments of the 2003 Iraq 
War.This particular phenomenon is already present and potentially growing in 
popularity with more and more legal scholars advocating for interdisciplinary 
approaches. 
163
This particular use of this approach provided a more in depth 
assessment of the 2003 Iraq War than that of a solely legal or political approach. As 
Rues-Smit articulates; the distinctive form, practice, and content of international law 
stems from politics in the same way that "the international legal order shapes politics 
through its discourse of institutional autonomy, language and practice of justification, 
multilateral form of legislation and structure of obligation."
164
As Shiner and Williams 
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argue, international legal rhetoric is more often than not used to rationalize political 
decisions motivated by self-interest.
165
 
This interconnectivity can be found regardless of whether international law is 
determinate, and provides sufficient insight into a situation, or whether it is 
indeterminate and unable to address a situation that was not anticipated when the rules 
were formulated.
166
 International law, however, more often than not finds itself on the 
indeterminate side of the spectrum, such as in instances of use of force and for that 
reason, as Dino Kritsiotis argues "debates over legal interpretation have come to 
structure the politics surrounding situations involving the use of force."
167
 The 
assessments, provided within this paper, of the 2003 invasion of Iraq by legal scholars 
adopting diverse stances relied heavily on politics.  
This situation however was inescapable given that the "dichotomization 
between ‘law’ and ‘politics’ does hold a particular relevance when studied in the 
context of how states utilize international law in their practices relating to the use of 
force in international relations."
168
 This is to say that even though states are political 
entities, they regularly resort to "legal reasoning and argumentation within their 
practices" despite that political operators recognize "law as a distinct system within 
their own system or sphere of existence."
169
 However, as Kristiotis goes on to 
articulate, that it is apparent from the practices of states that they don’t see the 
supposed divide between law and politics as "monolithic" nor do they set out to define 
law and politics and their respective parameters.
170
 Scholars such as Koskenniemi 
downplay this supposed divide arguing that "there is no 'essential distinction' between 
the two."
171
 Regardless of the presence or extent of the divide between law and 
politics within political and legal discourses, it has become abundantly clear that 
outlining the relationship between the two concepts is increasingly difficult and 
ultimately inconsequential to the assessment of a conflict. 
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It is important to thus ask why the authors presented in the thesis insisted on 
using political terms within their legal assessments of the Iraq War. The decision to 
utilize political terminology and concepts does not stem from an insufficiency oflegal 
sources or a lack of academic prowess but rather recognition that both the 
international legal and international relations disciplines provide insights into the 
developments within the international arena that scholars aim to explain.
172
 The 
incentive to invoke international relations terms is argued to be based "on the claim 
that an understanding of the sister discipline will enrich an international lawyer's 
practical and intellectual work, from doctrinal analysis and policy prescriptions to 
international legal theory."
173
There are however many reasons why scholars would 
want to utilize political or international relations concepts, such as the need "to 
diagnose international policy problems and to formulate solutions to them", the 
analysis of international institutions, or the assessment of new issues within the 
international community.
174
By incorporating international relations terms and ideas, 
this approach offers a closer approximation to the realities of today than each 
discipline could provide alone. This less detached approach reflects the complexities 
of global conflicts that international law is ill-equipped to handle on its own. Treaties 
and customs established over decades often fall short of providing all the necessary 
tools for handling a situation and thus diplomatic and political tools fill in those gaps. 
As Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood articulate "International Relations and 
International Law have rediscovered one another."
175
These authors go on to say that 
"outsiders might categorize them as dividing the study of the international system in 
terms of positive versus normative, politics versus law. Insiders in both disciplines 
reject such facile distinctions."
176
 
The increasingly complex multilayered conflicts within the international 
community call for an equally multilayered approach to the assessment of the issue 
that provides a deeper level of insight than one discipline alone. This is not to 
undermine either discipline but rather recognition of the complexity of global 
conflicts and the extensive interconnectivity of international law and international 
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relations. This is not to say that the assessment of a global conflict should ignore the 
legal framework in place and simply deliberate on the matter using political terms. 
International law remains an important player within the international arena that 
supplements debates on the morality or legitimacy of actions with questions of 
lawfulness. International law in many ways provides a reference for which to hold 
states accountable for their actions, as an instrument of curtailing blatant and 
belligerent exercise of power. However it is important not to get carried away and 
focus too deeply on protecting the sanctity of international law at the cost of 
exasperating already tumultuous situations. It is important to take into consideration 
real world factors that potentially outweigh protecting the sanctity of the law, such as 
civilian causalities and political, humanitarian, and economic ramifications when 
deciding whether international law is favoring a stance that is on the right side of 
history. 
Given such a deep entanglement of both the legal and political discourses, it is 
only logical that such an interdisciplinary approach would seem attractive to scholars 
and politicians alike attempting to dissect the complexities of today's world. An 
interdisciplinary approach responds to criticisms of international legal analysis that 
suggests that international law is too detached from the real world situations that have 
come about decades after the relevant legal principles were created. Said criticisms 
call for reformation of the international system in order to make it more responsive to 
the political developments of today's world. This is not to say that focusing on politics 
is a panacea as this approach also responds to fears that without international law, the 
larger more powerful states would have no regulation whatsoever.  An 
interdisciplinary approach bridges this gap and thus provides a better fuller 
description of global conflict that could potentially lead to a better rounded solution in 
the future. In the case of Iraq, regardless of their views on the legality or legitimacy of 
the actions taken, the authors within each section provided an assessment of the 
conflict that utilized both legal and political concepts. It is becoming abundantly clear 
that this interdisciplinary approach is rightfully growing in popularity and has 
warranted further attention for the numerous advantages it presents. 
 It is important to realize that there is more at stake than the rule of law when 
assessing a situation, as morality and normative concepts inevitably play a part. For 
that reason, it only seems logical that further refinement and attention to an 
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interdisciplinary approach that explores the overlap between the two disciplines, 
should be the next step.
177
It is important to take advantage of this particular 
phenomenon, which marks a reduction of barriers between both disciplines, brought 
on by a need to adequately internalize global events, and move towards furthering the 
discussion. As Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood articulate, "Scholars in both 
disciplines should profit from the moment to develop a genuinely collaborative 
research agenda that will generate both practical and theoretical insights."
178
 Efforts 
aimed at bridging the gap between disciplines, establishing parameters and terms of 
engagement as well as mapping out important points of interest would be extremely 
beneficial to what is clearly a necessary practice. This incorporation of the 
international relations and international law disciplines on a better consolidated 
platform would provide for analyses that reflect the various layers of global conflicts 
with a level of depth that no single discipline could reach. 
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